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Recent Developments
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEXBASED MORTALITY TABLES

I

n Arizona Governing Committee for
Tax Deferred Annuity and Compensation Plans 4.1. Nathalie Norris
_U.S.-. 103 S.Ct. 3492, 77 L.Ed.2d.
1236 (1983), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that an employer
may not offer its employees' life annuity
plans from private insurance companies
that use sex-based actuarial mortality
tables. To allow employers to do so, the
Court found, would in effect permit the
practice of discrimination on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.c. §§ 2000 et seq., which makes it
unlawful employment practice "to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)(1) (1964).

I.
Since 1974, Arizona's Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity
and Deferred Compensation plans has
administered a deferred compensation
plan whereby it has selected several
insurance companies to participate in
the "Plan" and, in turn, has offered its
employees to enroll in the plan. When
an employee chooses to participate in
Arizona's plan, he must designate one of
the participating companies chosen by
Arizona in which he wishes to invest his
deferred wages. Once the employee so
designates and decides the amount of
compensation to be deferred each
month, Arizona is responsible for
withholding the appropriate sums from
the employee's wages and directing
those sums to the appropriate company.
Insurance companies generally base
the amount of monthly retirement
benefits due a retired employee on: 1)
the amount of compensation the employee defers; 2) the employee's age
at retirement; and 3) the employee's sex.
All the companies chosen by Arizona to
participate in the plan employ sex-based
mortality tables to calculate benefit
amounts. The tables award a man larger
monthly payments than a woman who
10-The Law Forum/Fall, I984

deferred the same amount of compensation and retired at the same age.
On May 3, 1975, respondent Nathalie
Norris, an employee of the Arizona
Department of Economic Security,
elected to participate in Arizona's plan,
and invested her deferred compensation
in Lincoln National Insurance Company's fixed annuity contract. Norris,
103 S.Ct. at 3495.
On April 25, 1978, Norris brought
suit against the state, the governing
committee and several of its members,
alleging that the plan discriminates on
the basis of sex.
II.
The Court's opinion first probed the
question of whether the defendants
would have violated Title VII had they
conducted the entire plan themselves,
without the participation of any insurance companies. The Court found
direction in its opinion in Los Angeles

Department of Water and Power 4.1.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), which
was apparently the first challenge to
contribution differences based on valid
actuarial tables since the enactment of
Title VII in 1974. In Manhart, the Court
held that an employer had violated the
statute by requiring its female employees
to make larger contributions to a
pension fund than male employees in
order to obtain the same monthly
benefits upon retirement. The Court
found that the pension fund treated each
woman "in a manner but for (her) sex
would (have been) different." 435 U.S.
at 710, quoting Developments in the Law,
Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of I964, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971).
Applying the "but for" standard
illustrated in Manhart, the Court in
Norris wholly rejected the defendants'
contention that the Arizona plan does
not discriminate on the basis of sex
because a man and a woman who defer
the same amount of compensation will
obtain upon retirement policies having
approximately the same present actuarial
value. The Court found no difficulty in
holding that the "classification of
employees on the basis of sex is no more
permissible at the pay-out stage of a
retirement plan than at the pay-in
stage." Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3497. It

further noted that the defendants'
assumption that sex may be properly
used to predict longevity is inconsistent
with the lesson of Manhart: that Title
VII requires employers to treat their
employees as individuals, not " 'as
simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual, or national class.'" Norris, 103
S.Ct. at 3498, quoting Manhart, 435
U.S. at 708 (emphasis by Court).
Thus, the majority opinion established
that "it is just as much discrimination
'because of... sex' to pay a woman lower
benefits when she has made the same
contributions as a man as it is to make
her pay larger contributions to obtain
the same benefits." Id. at 3499.
continued on page 14

COMPUTER SOFTWARE
COPYRIGHTABILITY

I

n Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin

Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the denial of Apple's motion
for preliminary injunction seeking to
restrain Franklin from infringing copyrights on 14 of its software programs.
The unanimous three-judge panel ruled
that copyright protection does extend to
operating programs.
Franklin manufactures and sells the
Ace 100 personal computer designed to
be "Apple compatible" so that peripheral equipment and software designed
for the Apple II could be used in
conjunction with the Ace 100. In order
to achieve this compatibility, Franklin
admittedly copied 14 of Apple's operating system programs (the instructions
which tell the computer which functions
to perform). Operating programs can be
stored on a variety of memory devices
such as semi-conductor "micro-chips,"
which are connected to the circuitry,
and "floppy disks" (flexible magnetic
disks similar to phonograph records).
These programs are referred to as
software, whereas the machinery of the
computer is known as hardware.
Franklin explained that designing its
own programs would be impractical and
would not ensure 100% compatibility
because "there were just too many entry

CASE COMMENT: Pouncey v.
State-Guilty and Insane

I

n Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264,
465 A.2d 475 (1983), the Court
of Appeals held that a defendant in
a criminal case could be found both
guilty of a crime and insane at the time of
its commission. In so holding, the Court
determined that an insanity verdiet does
not necessarily defeat the element of
criminal intent.
To reach a verdiet of guilty, the demands of due process require that the
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant engaged in a
prohibited act (actus reus) and that the
defendant possessed the criminal intent
(mens rea) to commit such an act. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970); see
generally, R. Perkins and R. Boyce,
Criminal Law 78-81 (3rd ed. 1982). T raditionally, a finding of insanity during
the commission of a crime would prevent
the rendering of a guilty verdiet because
it was deemed that the defendant, in being
insane, was incapable of forming the required criminal intent. See Bethea v.
United States, 365 A.2d 64, 72 n.15
(D.C. App. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
911 (1976).
In Pouncey, the defendant was charged
with the first degree murder of her five
year old son. She pleaded not guilty and
interposed the defense of insanity. The
evidence disclosed that the defendant
believed her son was pursued by the devil
and the only way to prevent her son from
going to hell was to kill him. The evidence further disclosed that the defendant had drowned her son and that she
was legally insane at the time the crime
was committed. The trial court found
the defendant guilty of first degree murder and legally insane at the time of the
offense. The defendant appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals, claiming that
the verdiets of guilty and insane were
mutually inconsistent and that she was
entitled to a verdiet of not guilty. The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior
to a decision by the Court of Special
Appeals.
In Pouncey, the Court of Appeals stated
that the insanity defense in Maryland was
defined by statute and court rule. Pouncey
v. State, 297 Md. at 266,465 A.2d at 476.
The Court noted that the Health-General
Code identifies the test for insanity and
responsibility for criminal conduct and
provides:
A defendant is not responsible for
criminal conduct if, at the time of
that conduct, the defendant, be14-The Law Forum/Fall, 1984

cause of mental retardation or a
mental disorder, lacks substantial
capacity:
( 1) 1'0 appreciate the criminality
of that conduct; or
(2) To conform that conduct to
the requirements of law."
MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §12107 (1982).1
Having disclosed the statutory law,
the Court noted that the verdict of guilty
and insane was not without precedent in
Maryland. Four years earlier, under a
statute not different in substance from
the criminal responsibility test set out
above, the court in Langworthy v. State,
284 Md. 588,399 A.2d 578 (1979), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1979), "held that
a person found guilty of a crime charged,
yet successful in asserting an insanity defense, could appeal from the guilty verdiet." Id., as cited in Pouncey v. State, 297
Md. at 266-267, 465 A.2d at 477. The
court in Pouncey then concluded that,
"necessary to that determination was a
finding that a guilty verdiet is not inconsistent with a special verdiet of insanity."
Id., 297 Md. at 267,465 A.2d at 477.

Although the court in Langworthy was
concerned with determining whether the
verdiet of guilty and insane was a final
judgment and thus appealable, it did not
miss the opportunity to interpret the insanity statute then in effect. Without
pointing to any explicit legislative history
directed to the statute, the court in langworthy reasoned that since the Court of
Special Appeals had previously determined that the demands of due process
require a defendant be provided the opportunity to prove his innocence even
though the prosecution has accepted the
defendant's insanity plea, then the statutory scheme for insanity must contemplate that there first be a determination
of guilt or innocence followed by a determination of insanity. Langworthy v. State,
284 Md. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584; see also
case comment, A Defendant Found Guilty
But Insane May Appeal His Conviction:
continued on page 26
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III.
Concluding that Title VII would have
been violated had the defendants run the
entire deferred compensation plan
themselves, without participation by
insurance companies, the Court then
focused attention on the issue of
whether a Title VII violation has been
committed, given the fact it was the
insurance companies chosen by Arizona
to participate in the plan that calculated
and paid the retirement benefits.
The Court, for purposes of resolving
the issue, found it necessary to define
the limits of Title VII violations. In so
doing, the Court again finding strength
from its opinion in Manhart, found that
Title VII "primarily govern(s) relations
between employees and their employer,
not between employees and third
parties." Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3499,
quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718, n.
33. However, the Court in Manhart was
quick to point out that despite said
"relations" such a limitation would not
disallow an employer to set aside equal
retirement contributions for each employee and let each, upon retirement,
purchase benefits in the open market.
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18 (footnote
omitted).
The defendants seized this language
and argued they did not violate Title VII
because the annuity plans offered by the
companies participating in the Arizona
plan reflect those available in the open
market. Unfortunately, no relevance or
substance was found in this defense by
the Court; rather, it found that Arizona
did not simply set aside retirement
benefits and allow employees to purchase
annuities in the open market, but created
a plan whereby employees could obtain an annuity only if they invested
in a company specifically chosen by
Arizona. In essence, by requiring
employees to choose from companies
selected only by the state, Arizona
became a party to each annuity contract
entered into by one of its employees.
The Court then reiterated the well
established rule, that "both parties to a
discriminatory contract are liable for
any discriminatory provisions the contract contains, regardless of whieh party
initially suggested inclusion of the
discriminatory provisions." Norris, 103
S.Ct. at 3501-02, See Williams v. New
Orleans Steamship Ass'n., 673 F.2d 742,
750-51 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
_U.S._ (1983).
continued on page 24
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IV.
One of the main purposes of Title VII
is to "make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
( 1975). Moody illustrated the existence
of a strong presumption in favor of
retroactive relief for Title VII violations,
and Manhart stressed that the presumption was one that could seldom be
overcome. Upon examination of the
relief afforded Norris by the district
court below, which affected only those
benefit payments made after the date of
its judgment, the Supreme Court found
that such an award was inconsistent with
the presumption elicited in Moody and
recognized in Manhart.
Before remanding the issue to the
district court, the Supreme Court
suggested that the lower court give more
attention to the fact that, before
Manhart, the use of sex-based tables
might reasonably have been assumed to
be lawful. In addition, the Court noted
that the decision in Manhart should have
put the defendants on notice that a man
and a woman who make the same
contributions to a retirement plan must
be paid the same monthly benefits.
Therefore, the lower court should
examine whether the defendants, after
Manhart, could have applied sex-neutral
tables to the pre-Manhart contributions
made by the plaintiff, Norris, and a
similarly situated male employee without violating any contractual rights that
the latter might have had on the basis of
his pre-Manhart contributions. Norris,
103 S.Ct. at 3503-04. If the defendants
could have done this, they should have
in order to prevent further discrimination, and it would therefore be equitable
that defendants be required to supplement any benefits coming due after the
district court's judgment by whatever
sum necessary to "make Norris whole."

Id.

V.
Justice Powell, joined by three other
justices, dissented as to the defendants'
liability, basing his assertation on the
premises that sex-based mortality tables
reflect objective actuarial standards and
employee classification on the basis of
sex in reference to life expectancy is a
"nonstigmatizing factor that demonstrably differentiates females from males
and that is not measurable on an
individual basis .... " Norris, 103 S.Ct. at
3509.
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The dissent further warned that the
potential effect of the majority's holding
would be to: 1) deny employees the
opportunity to purchase life annuities at
lower costs because (a) the cost to
employers of offering unisex annuities is
prohibitive, or (b) insurance carriers
would not choose to write such
annuities; 2) inflict the heavy cost
burden of equalizing benefits sustained
by those insurance companies and
employers choosing to offer such on
current employees; and 3) have a
disruptive impact on the operation of an
employer's pension plan as an unforeseen contingency jeopardizing the insurer's solvency and the insured's
benefits. Id.
The potential effect of the majority's
holding on insurance companies and
employers has yet to be fully observed.
Nonetheless, it is now clearly established
that an employer or insurer can no
longer fashion his personal policies on
the basis of assumptions about the
differences between men and women
previously believed to be valid. W

by Robert J. Farley
Lack of Jury Impartiality
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In 1919, the Judicial Code, § 269 (28
U.S.c. § 391) espoused the principle
that on any appeal, a court was to
examine the trial record "without regard
to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties." The essence of this
provision was incorportaed in Rule 61
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This harmless error provision instructs
the district courts that throughout a trial
proceeding judges "must disregard any
error which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."
(emphasis added). Support for this
principle can be found in De Santa v.
Nehi Corp., 171 F.2d 696 (2d. Cir.
1948), where the court held that it is
considered best practice for appellate
courts to act in accordance with the
mandate of Rule 61. The principle of
Rule 61 was ultimately codified by
Congress to be specifically applied to
appellate courts in 28 U.S.c. §2111
(1949).
In McDonough Power, the Supreme
Court noted that a fair trial requires an
impartial trier of fact- U[ a] jury capable
and willing to decide the case solely on
the evidence before it," Smith v. Phillips,
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) and that an

important safeguard of jury impartiality
is the voir dire examination. The court
held that in order to uphold the due
process requirement of impartiality,
prospective jurors must answer honestly
questions posed to them.
With these principles in mind, the
Supreme Court reviewed the varied
responses given by prospective jurors in
McDonough when the history of severe
injuries question was posed. The range
of responses indicated that each juror
interpreted the question differently;
some jurors' responses revealed injuries
resulting from minor incidents while
other jurors' responses failed to disclose
injuries resulting from serious accidents.
The court acknowledged that even
though the jurors were mistaken by
failing to disclose various injuries
sustained by their family members, their
responses were honest in light of their
interpretation of the voir dire question.
The Supreme Court held that the
policy of judicial management, evidenced
by the harmless error rules of disregarding errors that do not interfere with the
fairness of a trial, must be upheld
because the importance of trial finality
outweighs evidence of trial imperfection.
To effect the policy behind the harmless
error rules, the court adopted the
following two-part test to evaluate the
propriety of granting a motion for a new
trial based on lack of information
received from a juror on voir dire
examinations: (1) "a party must first
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir
dire" and (2) "that a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause." _U.S. _ , _ .
There are two concurring opinions in
McDonough Power. Justice O'Connor
concurred with the majority, holding
that "honesty of a juror's response is the
best initial indicator of whether the
juror in fact was impartia1." _ U.S.
- , _ . However, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence is written with the view that
the ultimate determinations regarding
the existence of juror bias and the need
for a new trial remain within the trial
court's discretion.
In the second concurrence, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
agreed with the majority's result but
asserted a different test to evaluate the
granting of a motion for a new trial based
on lack of information by a juror on voir
dire examination. Justice Brennan's test
focuses on a juror's bias, not his
honesty, and requires a party seeking a
new trial to demonstrate that: (1) "the

